Published in the Journal of Retirement, Winter 2014, Vol. 1, No. 3: pp. 97-111.

Recently, a new type of variable annuity has been marketed to investors which is based on structured product-like investments instead of the mutual fund-like investments found in traditional variable annuities. Embedding a structured product into a variable annuity introduces substantial complexity into an investment typically considered conservative. In this paper, we describe structured product based variable annuity (spVA) crediting formulas and how they differ from traditional VAs, value the embedded derivative position for a range of example parameters, and calculate the fair cap levels required to fairly compensate investors for the derivative position. We also provide extensive backtests of spVA crediting formulas using our calculated cap levels and compare the results to their underlying indexes. Our findings suggest that the complexity of spVAs can be used to hide fees and reduce the comparability of variable annuities to other investments in the market.

In recent years, investment banks have issued structured products linked to indexes they create rather than just linking to standardized indexes from Standard & Poor’s. In doing so, the issuers create additional difficulties for retail investors to understand these, sometimes complex, investments. We illustrate the potential conflicts of interest created with structured products linked to proprietary volatility indexes although the conflicts are present in other proprietary index based investments as well.

In the 1990s, investment banks switched from underwriting reverse convertibles and tracking securities issued by operating companies like Citicorp and Reynolds Metals linked to their own stock to issuing and underwriting structured products linked to unrelated publicly traded companies like Cisco Systems. This change in investment banks’ role led to a dramatic proliferation of new issuances and ever more complicated payoff structures since the underwriters were no long limited to underwriting securities other companies wanted to issue. Investment banks could now issue notes in relatively small denominations linked to publicly traded companies that the brokerage firms could then sell through their retail sales force. The complexity of these notes made regulatory oversight more difficult and allowed issuers to sell structured products with very low issue date values.

SLCG’s prior research showed that structured products were poor investments because they were significantly overpriced when offered and were, at best, thinly traded thereafter. SLCG concluded that overpriced structured products survived in the marketplace because structured products’ opaqueness obscured their true risks and costs and the high fees earned by underwriters and salespersons.

The current SLCG study presents a brief history of the structured products program at Lehman Brothers and illustrates many of its points with Lehman structured products examples including Principal Protected Notes, Enhanced Return Notes, Absolute Barrier Notes, Steepeners and Reverse Convertibles. The study reports that the spectacular failure of Lehman brothers in September 2008 left investors holding more than $8 billion face value $US-denominated structured products. Dr. Craig McCann, the study’s principal author, explained that the Lehman experience is especially instructive of the opportunity for mischief presented by financial engineering; faced with increasing borrowing costs Lehman stepped up its issuance of structured products where its credit risk would not be priced into the debt.